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The rule of the game, therefore, is not for the reader 
to say 'You can't do that', because what we describe 
can be and has been done, to varying degrees of suc- 
cess. Rather, you may say, 'That isn't quite right', 
or 'You've oversimplified a very deep philosophical 
p rob lem' . . . .  
(Rieger 1975, p. 195) 
AI must come to terms with the fact it is concerned with 
many issues that are also of interest to philosophers. I 
hope that the cooperation here will be of more use 
than was the head-butting that has gone on between 
AI people and linguists. 
(Schank 1980, p. 178) 
ABSTRACT. Roger Schank's research in AI takes seriously the ideas that understanding 
natural language involves mapping its expressions into an internal representation scheme 
and that these internal representations have a syntax appropriate for computational 
operations. It therefore falls within the computational approach to the study of mind. 
This paper discusses certain aspects of Schank's approach in order to assess its potential 
adequacy as a (partial) model of cognition. This version of the Language of Thought 
hypothesis encounters some of the same difficulties that arise for Fodor's account. 
Two influential and much-discussed themes in the philosophy of mind/ 
cognitive science literature are (1) that understanding natural language 
involves mapping its expressions onto some kind of internal representa- 
tion scheme, and (2) that the resulting representations exhibit a syntax 
such that they are susceptible to computational operations. These ideas 
have been taken seriously in Roger Schank's artificial intelligence 
projects at Yale University, where a variety of computer programs 
have been based upon them. Schank's ultimate research goal is not 
only to build AI systems that exhibit human-like linguistic behavior, 
but also to provide a psychologically accurate computer model of 
various human mental processes involved in the understanding of 
language. His work, therefore, falls squarely within the 'computational' 
approach to the study of mind. 
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Although computational theories of mental phenomena are commit- 
ted to the apparatus of internal representations, they are often quite 
vague as to the nature of those representations. Schank's work has 
the merit of describing the hypothesized representation scheme in 
considerable detail. Since he regards it as providing a psychologically 
accurate necessary condition for the use of natural language, his theory 
may be viewed as one version of the Language of Thought hypothesis 
(which Schank calls 'Conceptual Dependency' theory, abbreviated as 
CD). 
This paper discusses some aspects of Schank's representation scheme, 
with an eye toward assessing its adequacy as a (partial) model of 
cognition. 2 1 shall begin by outlining various features of the theory, and 
at points later on I shall try to connect it with recent philosophical work 
by Jerry Fodor and others. Schank's own account, I shall argue, con- 
tains many of the same pitfalls that may be found in the philosophical 
discussions of the Language of Thought. Some of these pitfalls will be 
familiar to philosophers with an interest in the computational approach 
to mind; others, I believe, have received little if any treatment in the 
literature. 
1.  A P R E L I M I N A R Y  A R G U M E N T  
Considerations of parsimony, Schank believes, argue for some sort of 
universal, internal representation scheme in the processing of sentences 
(Schank 1975, p. 28; Schank and Riesbeck 1981, pp. 14-16). To illus- 
trate, suppose that the representation scheme was not universal, but 
rather language-specific. In that case, a speaker of English would map 
sentences onto English-specific representation structures, while a 
speaker of French would do the same vis-h-vis French-specific struc- 
tures. Let E stand for some English sentence, and F for its French 
equivalent, while R(E) stands for the internal representation of E, and 
R(F) for its French counterpart. Then, a translation of E to F would 
require (i) mapping E onto R(E); (ii) correlating R(E) with R(F); and 
(iii) mapping R(F) onto F. Assuming that R(E) is not identical to R(F), 
an increasing number of representations along with language-specific 
correlation rules of type (ii) would be required as more languages 
entered the picture. Matters would be considerably simpler, however, 
if one universal representation scheme underlay a variety of languages. 
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In that case, translation of an English sentence into its French equiva- 
lent would require only mapping E onto R, and then R onto F. 
This appeal of an interlingual representation scheme, incidentally, 
was recently noted in a Time Magazine account of Japanese language- 
translating machines. The Fujitsu Company has developed devices that 
provide at least rough translations between English, Japanese, French, 
and German (additional languages are planned as well). As a researcher 
from Fujitsu put it: 'If we did not use interlingua, then each pair of 
languages would require the development of a specific set of grammat- 
ical rules and a bilingual dictionary. Interlingua acts as the hub of a 
wheel' .3 
Of course, the utility of an interlingua for machine translation does 
not prove that monolingual speakers employ a language of thought, 
although it does explain why Schank, whose projects include trans- 
lation, might find it appealing. Further arguments will be considered 
later on. Note also that the argument just canvassed on behalf of an 
interlingual representation scheme is silent as to the nature of that 
scheme. But Schank goes on to say a good deal about that topic. His 
account is distinctive in its commitment to the primacy of meaning over 
syntax; Conceptual Dependency is essentially a meaning representation 
scheme. Thus, Schank's language-processing systems do not attempt to 
build separate syntactic representations of natural language sentences; 
in fact, syntactic considerations come into play only when required in 
order to help resolve ambiguities, find linguistic units that have been 
predicted by semantic features, etc. 
2 .  C O N C E P T U A L  D E P E N D E N C Y  T H E O R Y :  V O C A B U L A R Y  
Schank's work on natural language understanding has focused primarily 
on the representation of actions - broadly construed so as to include 
natural forces as 'agents'. Thus, 'John hit Mary' and 'Hurricane Gilbert 
hit Mexico' fall under the purview of actions, so conceived. With an 
eye toward obvious objections to this view, Schank emphasizes that 
his aim is to capture how ordinary speakers conceptualize the world, 
irrespective of whether such an account will withstand close ontological 
scrutiny (Schank 1973a, p. 206; Schank 1975, p. 41; cf. Rieger 1975, 
p. 187). It remains to be seen, of course, whether ordinary speakers 
do in fact view the world in the way that Schank's account dictates. If 
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they do, and their view harbors some incoherence, then a computer 
model of their view will naturally exhibit the same incoherence. 
The core of Schank's internal representation scheme, Conceptual 
Dependency, involves an ACT, which is an action performed on some 
OBJECT. The actor is known as a PICTURE PRODUCER (PP). 
ACTs are directed toward a LOCATION, which indicates their DI- 
RECTION, and may result in an OBJECT's being in a particular 
STATE, or a RECIPIENT's coming to possess an OBJECT. From 
these ingredients, a conceptualization may be formed, i e., a representa- 
tion structure which indicates what was done by whom, to what, etc. 
These ingredients of CD theory sound suspiciously close to categories 
of natural language, but Schank takes pains to insist that the conceptual 
level is extralinguistic: 
We have required that the meaning representation that we use be language-free . . . .  [W]e 
began to believe that language and thought were separable structures (Schank 1975, p. 
7). 
What does this mean? In its most benign sense, the point would appear 
to be that internal representations are not identical to natural language 
sentences. But while this may be true under a narrow interpretation, 
Conceptual Dependency vocabulary bears a striking relationship to 
familiar terms in natural language. Consider, for instance, the eleven 4 








Apply a force to 
Move a body part 
Take something to the inside of an animate 
object 
Take something from inside an animate ob- 
ject, and force it out 
To physically grasp an object 
ACTS That Cause State Changes 
PTRANS To change the location of something 
ATRANS To change an abstract relationship 
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To produce a sound 
To direct a sense organ toward a particular 
stimulus 
To transfer information 
To create or combine thoughts 
Schank's assumption is that the meaning of action-sentences can be 
captured by way of these eleven primitives. Consider, for example, the 
sentence 'John ate a frog'. Its CD analysis looks like this (Schank 1975, 
p. 24): 
, mouth John 
JOHN e=* INGEST *--%-° frog, D I ~..I 





JOHN is the PP; INGEST is the ACT, and the symbol ' ~ '  marks a 
mutual dependency relation. The OBJECT of the ACT is designated 
by 'frog'; 'D' indicates the ACT's DIRECTION; and the INSTRU- 
MENT of John's ACT is yet another ACT in which JOHN MOVEd 
his hand. 
In what sense is this representation scheme 'extralinguistic'? To be 
sure MTRANS and MBUILD are not (so far as I know) terms of any 
natural language, and MOVE is defined more restrictively than its 
English language counterpart, although the meaning of INGEST offers 
no surprise. JOHN, according to Schank, is not the English name 
'John', but rather a pointer to all the information that we have about 
John (apparently, a reduction of objects to bundles of properties is 
ultimately envisagedS). But if the categories just outlined actually repre- 
sent the categories in which we think, there is little evidence that it is 
'language-free'; indeed, it seems perverse to maintain that category 
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terms that can be defined are extralinguistic. Moreover, Schank offers 
no argument for such a requirement. The success of his computational 
models does not derive from that assumption, and other considerations 
(philosophical, psychological, linguistic) may point in the opposite di- 
rection. Jerry Fodor once suggested that 'the language of thought may 
be very like a natural language' (Fodor 1975, p. 156). 
The MTRANS primitive, denoting transfer of information, deserves 
special notice. Information conveyed in an MTRANS is always a com- 
plete conceptualization (corresponding to a proposition), with 
MTRANS taking the recipient case. Information transfer here is 
thought of in terms of a proximate source and a receiver. The eye, for 
example, may be regarded as the proximate information source. What 
is the 'receiver' here? Schank answers that information first goes to a 
Conceptual Processor, where all conscious thoughts occur. This CP, 
then, is viewed as the recipient. From the Conceptual Processor, infor- 
mation may go to an Intermediate Memory (as when we remember a 
telephone number just long enough to dial it), or to Long Term Memory 
(in cases where we need the telephone number on a later occasion). 
These sorts of mental categories have been argued for by various cogni- 
tive psychologists, and some interesting experiments have been cited 
in support of them. But I want to focus here for a moment on an odd 
restriction that Schank imposes on Long Term Memory, or LTM. He 
writes that it 
contains all the information that is known by a person. We postulate that only true facts 
are stored in L T M  and that false things are derived from them. (Schank 1975, p. 44) 
Schank's 'postulate' (that only truths are stored in Long Term Mem- 
ory), besides being unnecessary, has little to recommend it. After all, 
whether or not something is true often cannot be perceptually discrimi- 
nated by an observer, and there is no reason to suppose that false beliefs 
arising in such circumstances cannot get into Long Term memory. 6 To 
clarify, suppose that I read in an encyclopedia that Abraham Lincoln 
was the sixteenth President of the United States, and suppose also that 
someone else (owing to a misprint) reads in a different encyclopedia 
that Lincoln was the fifteenth President. It is scarcely plausible to 
suppose that the information I got goes into my LTM, while the other 
person's information does not get represented in LTM; our relation- 
ships to our respective sources of information were virtually identical. 
Well, perhaps Schank means that what goes into each of our LTMs is 
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not the encyclopedia's information simpliciter, but rather the infor- 
mation that the encyclopedia reported the information. (This might pro- 
vide the basis for Schank's claim that falsehoods are derived from our 
stock of stored truths.) There may, of course, be situations where 
this occurs, but no plausible psychological theory can insist that all 
information stored in LTM is of this kind; we frequently fail to re- 
member where we got a particular piece of information. In such cases 
it is the information, not the source + report, that we normally retain 
in long term memory. There is evidence that Schank agrees, for he 
represents the sentence 'John read about Nixon in the Encyclopedia' 
as follow (Schank 1975, p. 61): 
John e ~  p MTRANS ~o 
Nixon ~ CP(John) 
ey ( ohn) 
John 





Schank adds that 'What John MTRANsed here were assorted unknown 
facts about Nixon'; he does not say that John MTRANSed the fact that 
the encyclopedia was reporting facts about Nixon. Since the putative 
facts may be incorrect, but may nonetheless be accepted by John, the 
'postulate' that Long Term Memory contains only truths is untenable. 
In terms of our example, we should say also that at least some of what 
goes into John's Long Term Memory is not knowledge. 
Why, then, does Schank endorse the curious doctrine that Long 
Term Memory contains only truths? The primary reason, I suggest, is 
that he takes himself to be proposing a knowledge representation 
scheme. In Schank's words, " 'Know" is represented as "being in the 
LTM of" '  (Schank 1975, p. 62). Moreover, I suggest, Schank realizes 
that knowledge requires truth. Thus, in order to accommodate these 
two ideas - (1) that a knowledge representation scheme is being pro- 
posed, and (2) that knowledge requires truth - it is stipulated that the 
system's Long Term Memory only contains truths. From here it is not 
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too difficult to conclude (as Schank in fact does conclude) that knowl- 
edge and belief are 'virtually identical'. 
Although this treatment of knowledge representation is quite com- 
mon in the artificial intelligence literature, it fares rather badly on two 
grounds. First, by requiring that all stored propositions be true, it 
ignores the question of how misrepresentation is possible, although this 
is a question that models of human cognition can scarcely afford to 
dismiss. And second, it fails to recognize that knowledge representa- 
tion, properly conceived, involves considerably more than just the well- 
organized storage of true propositions. To determine just what else is 
needed comes as no easy task, as post-Gettier epistemology has made 
clear. But knowledge representation systems that ignore this question 
are, I submit, parading under a false banner. 
Earlier, it was mentioned that CD theory provides a computational 
advantage for translation from one language to another. The primitive 
ACTs of CD theory are also interesting insofar as they allow for a 
common representation of sentences that have significant overlapping 
conceptual content. This too has a computational advantage, insofar as 
allowable inferences associated with ACT primitives only need to be 
stored once in the system. For example, (1) 'John gave Mary a book', 
(2) 'Mary received a book from John', (3) 'John bought Mary a book' 
and (4) 'John stole a book for Mary' would all be diagrammed using the 
ATRANS primitive (for abstract transfer of possession). This ATRANS 
primitive serves as the common connecting point for probable infer- 
ences concerning transfer of possession (Who has the object now? Who 
had it before? Did John want Mary to have a book?), thereby obviating 
the need to store the same inference rules redundantly. Of course, the 
four sentences in this example have important differences of meaning 
also. Such differences would tend to be brought out by different Instru- 
mental case diagrams (indicating the means by which the ACT was 
accomplished). 
Despite the inferential (computational) advantage accruing to ACT 
primitives, there are times when this approach does not work very well. 
For example, one of the inferences from EXPEL is that the EXPELled 
object was previously INGESTed. But the sentence 'John spat at Mary' 
is represented in terms of John's EXPELling saliva (Schank 1975, p. 
58), although in most instances saliva is manufactured, not INGESTed. 
It is hardly surprising that a mere eleven ACT primitives should fail to 
capture the core meaning of most natural-language action verbs. The 
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problem becomes particularly acute, however, for action terms which 
operate against a background of social institutions and conventions. As 
Schank acknowledges, 'if we have 'John kissed Mary', our mapping of 
kiss into 'MOVE lips towards' will not simplify the problem one bit' 
(Schank 1975, p. 81). Similar points could be made about 'The police- 
man gave me a parking ticket' and 'My friend has been married and 
divorced three times'. In all such cases, ACT primitives appear to be 
of little service; what is needed in these particular cases is knowledge 
of appropriate social institutions. 
Schank does not indicate how he thinks we come to possess our 
representation language. Suppose, as some writers have, that it is in- 
nate. In that case, one would expect its ACT categories to be universal. 
This need not imply that all the categories of CD are employed in every 
possible culture: in discussing the notion of transfer of ownership, 
Schank remarks that 'it is possible to conceive of a culture and therefore 
a language that would have a different set of those abstract relations 
or none at all (and thus no ATRANS)' (1975, p. 55), In such an 
instance, the universal ACT primitive ATRANS would simply not get 
actualized. But another speculation suggests that CD might not turn 
out to be universal after all: 'If in fact, there exists a culture where life 
is viewed as a continuum rather than a series of distinct actor-action 
events, Conceptual Dependency would not do as a conceptual model 
of such a culture' (Schank 1973a, p. 206). In that case, Schank's re- 
course would presumably be either to hold (1) the (very unparsimoni- 
ous) view that each of us has multiple innate representation languages, 
perhaps only one of which actually gets employed by a given individual, 
or (2) that the representation language is not innate. On the latter 
alternative, one's representation language would presumably be ac- 
quired in a linguistic environment, which raises the suspicion that it 
may not really be a necessary condition for the understanding of natural 
language (cf. Fodor 1975, Chap. 2, for further arguments). For if the 
representation language itself could be acquired (without an underlying 
language), why could a natural language not be acquired this way also? 
3. C O N C E P T U A L  S Y N T A X  
Despite the subordination of natural-language syntax to meaning in 
Schank's sentence analyzer, there is considerable emphasis given to the 
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formal structure of Conceptual Dependency diagrams. Here are some 
examples (Schank 1975, pp. 38-9): 
(I) PP <=> ACT 
o 
(2) ACT < PP 
(3) ACT < 
(4) ACT < 






Rule (1) says that Picture Producers (usually, animate agents) can 
perform actions; Rule (2) means that ACTs can have objects; Rule (3) 
means that ACTs can have directions (a variable in place of PP~ or PP2 
indicates an unknown position). Rule (4) indicates that ACTs can have 
recipients. And Rule (5) says that ACTs have instruments that are 
themselves complete (completeness is shown by the double lines be- 
tween two arrowheads). Rules (2) through (5) collectively represent 
conceptual cases - modifiers of ACTs - and a specific number of them 
(either two or three) is required by every ACT. 
In some instances, the CD syntax rules permit a particular structure; 
in other cases they require it. One such requirement involves the 
Instrumental case. Returning to the CD representation of 'John ate a 
frog', notice that while the Instrumental case depiction is a reasonable 
inference, it does not represent information explicitly given in the 
sample sentence (John could have done this even though he possessed 
no hands). In fact, although Schank will insist that ACTs always have 
instruments, he frequently omits their depiction in instances where the 
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instrument was not expressly specified, and cannot be known with 
virtual certainty. 7 If the instrument is not filled in by the analysis of a 
sentence into CD, it can be obtained by an inference mechanism that 
relies on default judgments. 
Whether  or not instrumental ACTS are explicitly shown, however, 
the requirement that every ACT must have an Instrumental case en- 
counters a familiar logical difficulty. 8 Since the instrument of an ACT 
is itself a complete (and distinct) conceptualization, the occurrence of 
one ACT will actually require an infinity of ACTs. For example, 
suppose that John eats ice cream, and that the instrumental ACT is 
his moving a spoon to his mouth. Now, the conceptual representation 
of 'John moves a spoon to his mouth'  will itself require an instrument, 
e.g., 'John activates the muscles in his arm', and so on. The problem 
is that if the performance of any given one ACT presupposes an infinity 
of ACTs, no ACTs will be possible at all. Schank, unfortunately, 
views the Instrumental case requirement only as providing a notational 
inconvenience: 
Since an analysis of this kind is not particularly useful and is quite bothersome to write, 
we do not do so. Rather,  whenever we represent a conceptualization we only diagram the 
main conceptualization and such instrumental conceptualizations as might be necessary to 
illustrate whatever part we are making (Schank 1975, p. 33; cf. Schank 1973a, p. 201). 
He continues: 
[T]he ACT in a conceptualization is really the name of a set of sequential actions that it 
subsumes (and are considered to be part of it). These instrumental conceptualizations 
are not causally related since they are not actually separable from each other. In actuality, 
they express one event and are thus considered to be part of one conceptualization. The 
rule is then, that one conceptualization (which may have many conceptualizations as part 
of it) is considered to be representative of one event (Ibid., p. 34, italics added). 
It is certainly plausible to maintain that the name of an event somehow 
encompasses its constituents, as the phrase 'the third game of the 1988 
World Series' might subsume a variety of events making up that baseball 
game. It is true also that in ordinary circumstances we do not carry the 
analysis of an act into its constituents very far. But these points do 
not obviate the fact that the Instrumental case requirement is logically 
committed to an infinity of constituents for any ACT. Each of those 
constituents must in turn be an ACT performed by an agent. Moreover,  
it is not at all clear what Schank means in claiming that the subsumed 
instrumental oonceptualizations are not 'actually separable',  since he 
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also maintains that they are sequential. If they are sequential, they 
certainly are separable, and they should therefore at least be candidates 
for causal interaction. In short, the universal requirement of Instrumen- 
tal cases is highly problematic. 9 
4. P E R C E P T I O N  A N D  I M A G E - R E P R E S E N T A T I O N  
As noted earlier, MTRANS involves the movement  of a conceptual- 
ization into an agent's CP, IM, or LTM, either from the CP of some 
other agent, or perhaps through memory or sense perception. So, if 
Mary informed Bill that his car had been wrecked, a conceptualization 
is ' transferred' from Mary's CP to Bill's, although the term 'transfer' 
is something of a misnomer, since the information does not vacate 
Mary's CP in going to Bill's. On the other hand, if Bill momentarily 
noticed some event that he was later able to recall, there would presum- 
ably have been some 'movement '  of information into LTM once the 
noticed event was no longer in Bill's consciousncss. 
Schank's treatment of perception raises some very interesting and 
difficult issues. Consider his representation of the sentence 'John saw 
Bill swimming' (Schank 1975, p. 61): 1° 
John ,,=~P MTRANS~ o 
water(in) 
Bill / ,, CP(John) John 
PTRANS ~ eye(John) A T T E N D  
Bill eye 
T°, 
1 t 1 
X Y Bill 
Given Schank's account of various ACT terms, this diagram appears 
to say that John transferred from his eye to his Conceptual Processor 
the conceptualization that Bill was swimming, u It should be remem- 
bered that this is intended, not as an account of perception sirnpliciter, 
but rather as a description of how a layman represents the perceptual 
process. Of course, few laymen could be expected to use categories 
such as 'conceptual processor'  and 'conceptualization' (see the end of 
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Section 5 below for further discussion), but perhaps the point here is 
just that John became aware that Bill was swimming, on the basis of 
seeing him. No doubt there is something right about this account, 
insofar as ~[ohn's conceptualization was derived from sense perception. 
At the same time, as one's account of perception becomes more 
sophisticated, some limitations of conceptual primitives emerge. It is 
important to bear in mind that, in Schank's account, the object of an 
MTRANS is always a conceptualization. But,  according to the above 
diagram, the conceptualization, before going to the CP, was somehow 
in the eye! There  is, I think, no need to be overly literal about what 
this means: it might involve a retinal image, or a series of images, 12 or 
perhaps even a percept or something of the sort. Nonetheless, even on 
this liberal reading, the MTRANS account of perception involves a 
major problem. The problem is that a conceptual representation must 
be constructed from the available sensory information; 13 it does not 
occur ' ready-made'  at the sensory level. And what ends up being cogni- 
tively available to an agent is considerably less than what was given in 
perception. In the current example, visual information received by John 
includes such items as whether Bill was nude or wearing swimming 
trunks, whether he was in a lake or a pool, whether anyone else was 
near him, whether the sun was bright, etc. - none of which appears in 
the CD graph displayed above. I do not mean that this omission repre- 
sents a mistake; no plausible CD diagram would include a description 
of everything 'contained in' the sensory data, for we are very seldom 
aware of everything we perceive. There is, in other words, a consider- 
able gap between sensory reception and conceptual representation. 
Although the process by which the one gives rise to the other is not 
well understood, the phenomenon itself seems uncontroversial.What 
the MTRANS account fails to detail, or even to acknowledge, is the 
process by which a specific piece of information is extracted from the 
greater wealth of information available at the sensory level. 
This point is important enough to warrant consideration from a 
slightly different point of view. A sensory representation, be it an 
image, image series, or percept, has the informational richness of a 
picture, a4 An interpretation of it leads to an informationally impover- 
ished cognitive counterpart.  And this interpretation requirement shows 
why a sensory content (imagistic or otherwise) is not by itself sufficient 
to yield the content of a Schankian conceptualization. If one asks, 
'What proposition does this image (or sensory content) convey?' ,  there 
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is no single answer, and afor t ior i  no single correct answer. The reason 
is that propositions have truth values, whereas icons do not. As Jerry 
Fodor  has written: 
To a first approximation, the kind of thing that can get a truth value is an assignment of 
some property to some object. A representational system must therefore provide appro- 
priate vehicles for expressing such assignments. Under what conditions, then, is a repre- 
sentation adequate to express the assignment of a property to an object? Well, one 
condition which surely must be satisfied is that the representation specify which property 
is being assigned and which object it is being assigned to. The trouble with trying to 
truth-value icons is that they provide no way of doing the former (Fodor 1975, p. 181). 
Fodor 's  idea is that a given image can represent  any number  of proposi- 
tions. The same image (sensory content),  for example,  could yield the 
proposit ion that Mary is fat, that Mary has a perm,  that Mary is wearing 
clothes, and so on. We may,  of course, assign an interpretation - 
perhaps consisting of a conjunction of propositions - to an sensory 
representation, but the point is that the assignment involves extrasen- 
sory factors. 15 
It appears  once again that the at tempt  to account for perception in 
terms of MTRANSing  a conceptualization from a sensory component  
to LTM has serious limitations. In part,  the problem arises from at- 
tempting to make conceptual primitives bear  too much weight. But the 
underlying issue is really just a version of a major  issue in the study of 
perception: How does sensory information mediate between the exter- 
nal world and a percipient 's mental  model thereof? No doubt it was 
not Schank's intention to address this problem in any depth, and, as 
noted earlier, it may be that his account does approximate the way in 
which 'ordinary '  people think about perception. No argument  is pro- 
vided, incidentally, to show that this is the case. In fact, it strikes me as 
unlikely that the layman has any view at all about whether propositional 
structures are contained, say, in a retinal image, or constructed from 
that image. But if the layman opts for the first account, as is suggested 
by Schank's analysis, the present discussion indicates that the ' common 
sense'  account cannot be extended very naturally into a more  accurate 
and complete version. 
5 .  i s  CD N E C E S S A R Y ?  
Does the use of CD graphs, including A C T  primitives, make  for a 
reasonable viewing of the way in which human beings represent events? 
Let us begin by canvassing some arguments on its behalf: 




Sentences that we understand are generally not stored in the 
form in which we encounter them. 'If two sentences with 
different words mean the same thing, then it is not easy to 
recall which particular words were used after a certain time' 
(Schank 1975, p. 17). 
Although sentences in a natural language may be ambigu- 
ous, there must be some way of representing unambiguously 
each possible meaning, since 'the original meaning that the 
speaker chose to impart was unambiguous' (Ibid., p. 15). 
Human hearers are able to supply information that was not 
explicitly given in a natural language sentence. The inferen- 
tial mechanisms that humans can apply to natural language 
sentences would not be economically accounted for in terms 
of natural language storage (Schank 1981, p. 16). 
To take these points in order: it is true that understanders engage in 
automatic paraphrasing, and without special effort they cannot repeat 
verbatim much of what they have heard. But it does not follow that 
the paraphrase must be represented in anything like CD graphs. While 
CD representation certainly provides a possible account, it is not obvi- 
ously preferable to some alternative. Might it not be the case that my 
representation of the meaning of natural language sentences is stored 
in the form of natural language expressions? 
Whatever the ruling on this issue, however, the appeal to CD repre- 
sentation as a required vehicle for natural language understanding must 
face a logical dilemma. For, if understanding natural language requires 
us to map natural language expressions onto CD, then in what does 
our understanding of CD consist? Clearly, it cannot be maintained that 
we in turn map CD expressions onto some other type of representation, 
for an infinite regress would then be under way. So it must be possible 
for us to understand CD expressions without mapping them in turn 
onto a meaning representation language. But if we can understand CD 
representation without doing any sort of mapping, then why should it 
not be possible to understand natural language without doing any map- 
ping either? 
Fodor has considered this argument, and has offered a reply to it. 
He draws an analogy between a human's mapping of natural language 
onto an inner representation scheme, and a compiler's producing ma- 
chine code from a higher-level language. Although a compiler (or 
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interpreter) is required to render the higher-level language usable, there 
is obviously no need for a second compiler to make the object code 
usable. Fodor  writes: 
What avoids an infinite regression of compilers is the fact that the machine is built to use 
the machine language. Roughly, the machine language differs from the input/output 
language in that its formulae correspond directly to computationally relevant physical 
states and operations of the machine . . . .  
[T]here are two ways in which it can come about that a device (including, presumably, 
a person) understands a predicate. In one case, the device has and employs a representa- 
tion of the extension of the predicate, where the representation is itself given in some 
language that the device understands. In the second case, the device is so constructed 
that its use of the predicate (e.g., in computations) comport [sic] with the conditions that 
such a representation would specify. I want to say that the first is true of predicates in 
the natural languages people learn and the second of predicates in the internal language 
in which they think (Fodor 1975, p. 66). 
This analogy between machines and humans breaks down in one crucial 
respect, however.  For  as Fodor  himself has pointed out elsewhere 
(Fodor 1981, ch. 8), the meaning of anything couched in machine 's  
' representat ion language'  is entirely parasitic upon the higher-level 
source code (whose meaning may in turn be dependent  upon a program- 
mer ' s  intentions). A given bit pattern,  in other words, might represent 
an ASCII  alphabetic character,  a positive integer in base ten, or a 
two's-complement  negative number.  There is nothing intrinsically re- 
presentative about  the machine-level ' language' .  Yet a ' language of 
thought '  such as Schank's (or, for that matter ,  Fodor 's)  must possess 
its representational power  independently of any higher-level language, 
since it is supposed to be a precondition of learning or processing a 
higher-level (natural) language. Machine language, however,  possesses 
no (classical denotative) semantics of its own; in a word, what the 
computer  'understands '  has no meaning. What  kind of understanding 
is this supposed to be? Needed,  of course, is a convincing account of 
how Conceptual  Dependency (or the Language of Thought) gets its 
reference to the world. This is the problem that John Haugeland dubbed 
' the mystery of original meaning'  (Haugeland 1985, pp. 119ff), and it 
remains a major  stumbling block for theories of mind that appeal to a 
Language of Thought.t6 
Turning at last to the second argument for CD representation (con- 
cerning the need for unambiguous representation),  although the various 
meanings of ambiguous sentences should be susceptible to unambiguous 
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representation, it does not follow that the representation must be inter- 
lingual, no matter whether the ambiguity is syntactic or semantic in 
origin. The multiple interpretations of syntactically ambiguous sen- 
tences (e.g., 'Flying planes can be dangerous') as well as semantically 
ambiguous sentences (e.g., 'I went to the bank') can be specified 
unambiguously in English. In fact, we quite commonly do so. 
The third point (concerning inference) has already been touched 
upon (see Section 2 above). There I argued that, although inferential 
parsimony was alleged to derive from a universal, language-indepen- 
dent representation scheme, neither inferential adequacy nor language- 
independence can in fact properly be claimed for it. Here I want to 
add that CD theory fails to provide a plausible account of inferences 
involving intensional contexts. 
Consider the sentence 'John believes that the Evening Star is red'. 
Even though the Evening Star is identical to the Morning Star, the 
substitution of the phrase 'Morning Star' into our example sentence 
may not be truth preserving. As is well known, extensionally equivalent 
terms are not intersubstitutable in belief-contexts, or indeed in any 
contexts describing a psychological state. Notice also, however, that 
even with intensional equivalence added, the terms may not be intersub- 
stitutable in those contexts either; the sentence 'John believes that 
horses are four-legged and eat grass' does not entail 'John believes that 
horses are graminivorous quadrupeds', despite the relevant synonymies. 
This is not merely a point about the relationship between sentences, 
for there is a related psychological point here as well. Insofar as the 
ascription of beliefs to an agent provides a vehicle for explaining that 
agent's actions, we need to know, not just what the agent believes, but 
(so to speak) how he or she believes it. The mental representations of 
the two sentences about horses are presumably different 17 and can 
therefore be expected to produce somewhat different causal conse- 
quences. Thus, it should not be supposed that both descriptions of 
John's belief are equally apt. 
The connection of these reflections with ACT primitives is as follows. 
Even if ACT primitives captured the meaning of natural language 
verbs, it does not follow that they can enter into the propositional 
content of anyone's psychological attitudes.Take, for example, Schank's 
CD representation of the sentence 'John remembered that he forgot to 
bring his sandwich to school' (Schank 1975, p. 60): 
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John ~ MTRANS , 
John . ~  MTRANS 
0 
John ~-~ CP(John) 
~ T~ ~ R 
PTRANS L ~  LTM(Johnt 
To 
sandwich ~ CP(John) 
~ - ~ ~  LTM(John, 
X school 
According to this diagram, the content of John's memory is approxi- 
mately this: he remembered that he failed to MTRANS into his CP 
the fact of PTRANSing his sandwich to school. What has happened 
here is Schank has incorporated a theory about how people represent 
things into an account of what they represent. And in this case, the 
account is highly implausible. Memories, like beliefs, figure into expla- 
nations of action; hence, if John really remembered that he failed to 
MTRANS something, he might be expected, say, to issue a report 
couched in those terms. But, unless John happens to be one of Schank's 
disciples intent upon making an idiosyncratic point, he will do no such 
thing. I conclude that there is a large class of sentences-those describing 
the contents of psychological attitudes for which the "use of ACT primi- 
tives in CD representations will not work. They simply do not accurately 
depict the contents of anyone's psychological states. Or, perhaps more 
accurately, they fail to allow for a distinction between de dicto and de 
re construals of those states. 
6. CONCLUSION 
There is no doubt that computer programs built upon Conceptual De- 
pendency theory have produced (in carefully delimited microworlds 18) 
some interesting and striking results. Viewed from a pragmatic perspec- 
tive, this approach is salutary; it may, for example, lead to increasingly 
user-friendly machines with natural language interfaces. But the goal 
of many researchers in artificial intelligence, Schank included, is to 
produce a psychologically valid computer model of human mental pro- 
cesses. I have set forth a number of serious difficulties which Conceptual 
Dependency theory - the bedrock of Schank's approach - must face. 
These difficulties, I believe, collectively constitute a strong reason for 
doubting that Conceptual Dependency theory provides (a component 
of) a plausible theory of mental representation. 
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I shall conclude by reiterating three problems that strike me as most 
important. (1) The reduction of human actions to a small group of 
primitives has little promise of succeeding, as does the parallel project 
of reducing objects to properties; (2) Primitive ACTS cannot plausibly 
serve to capture the contents of intentional states; this provides a second 
reason for thinking that Conceptual Dependency diagrams cannot get 
by with ACT primitives everywhere replacing natural language action 
verbs; and (3) The kind of project envisaged by Schank ultimately 
requires a 'naturalized' semantics for the 'language of thought', whether 
that 'language' appears in a human being or a machine. Very little 
work has been done to date in this area, and in this respect, Schank's 
program is no worse off than many other computational theories of 
mind. I do not know whether such a project of 'naturalized' semantics 
can possibly succeed. If points (1) and (2) are correct, however, the 
'language of thought' requiring a naturalized semantics will not look 
very much like the language of Conceptual Dependency Theory. 
NOTES 
1 An ancestor of this paper was written while I was on sabbatical leave from the University 
of Michigan, Flint, during which time I held a fellowship in the Computer Science 
Department of Wright State University. Revisions were made while I held a Visiting 
Lectureship at the University of Waikato. I am grateful to these three institutions for 
their support, and to James H. Fetzer, David Hemmendinger, and Edwin Hung for 
helpful comments on earlier versions. 
2 CD theory has played a less explicit role in Schank's most recent work (Schank 1977, 
1980, 1982, and 1986), where the aim has been to develop accounts of 'higher-level' 
knowledge structures. Nonetheless, much of CD theory is embedded in the later work 
as well; consequently, its difficulties tend also to be absorbed into the more recent 
accounts. 
3 Time Magazine (International Edition), July 24, 1989, p. 64. 
4 The number of primitives Conceptual Dependency theory has varied; at one time 
fourteen were employed. This is understandable, given Schank's experimental approach 
to the issue of representation. 
5 Christopher Riesbeck writes: 
What is lacking is a well-defined internal structure for PPs [Picture Producers]. 
Presumably a PP is a bundle of features, but how many features there are, how 
many it takes for an object to qualify as a certain kind of PP, how features relate to 
each other, how features which are discrete relate to the perception of a world that 
is not, all these questions are unanswered (Riesbeck, in Schank 1975, p. 114). 
Although Riesbeck registers no skepticism about the possibility of providing 'a well- 
defined internal structure for PPs', the history of unsuccessful attempts by phenomenalists 
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to 'reduce' physical objects to collections of sensory data suggests that a workable "fea- 
ture" account of PPs is not likely to be forthcoming. 
6 This kind of reflection led Fodor to argue for 'methodological solipsism', one point 
being that psychological explanations involve opaque construals of mental states (Fodor 
1981, Chapter 9). If you and I are presented with different examples of a metallic 
substance, gold in color, we may both acquire the belief that 'My sample is genuine 
gold'. And pace Schank, this belief may go into both of our LTMs even though I was 
viewing iron pyrite, and you were viewing the genuine article. In this case my LTM 
contains a false belief, while yours contains a true one. 
7 For example, the representation of 'John punched Mary' would show John's moving 
his fist as the instrumental ACT, while the CD representation of 'John went to New 
York' would not specify the instrumental ACT (he might have taken a plane or a bus or 
a train, etc.). 
s The universal requirement of an Instrumental case was explicitly absent in Schank's 
early discussions. See Schank 1972, especially pp. 572 and 574. 
9 It should be remembered that Conceptual Dependency theory is intended, in part, as 
a model of human psychology. But no psychological argument is provided for claiming 
that we must represent every action as having an instrument. Here, defenders of 'basic 
actions' might extend their ontological claims into the psychological realm, the idea being 
that basic actions constitute a necessary ingredient in our representation of actions. 
10 Notice that no distinction is drawn here between (1) 'John saw Bill swimming', and 
(2) 'John saw that Bill was swimming'. In fact, Schank's version of CD theory does not 
appear to distinguish these two expressions. Since the object clause of (1) is the object 
of an MTRANS, it can go into LTM, and therefore serve an object of knowledge. But 
this must mean that the object clause of (1) is being regarded as propositional. 
11 Swimming, of course, means more than moving oneself about in the water, but Schank 
employs the current shorthand just for the purpose of illustration. 
12 See, for example, Dretske (1981, ch. 6, p. 145). The entire Chapter 6 of his book is 
an excellent and fascinating study of perception from the standpoint of information 
theory. 
13 In the example under discussion, much of the sensory information is visual, but 
important clues may also include proprioceptive data. Information concerning turning of 
the head, for example, is valuable for determining whether it is the perceived object or 
the percipient that is moving. 
14 This analogy is suggested by Dretske, op. cit., pp. 137-143, and does not imply that 
sensory representations need be imagistic. 
15 It is worth noting that other sorts of representation schemes are subject to the same 
point. The inscription 'my banjo', for example, could be taken as a referring phrase, or 
as a series of alphabetic characters. Context and convention, not the 'representation 
itself' are the crucial determiners. 
16 For interesting, related discussions of this issue, see Fetzer (1988a, 1989) and Searle 
(1980). 
Fodor has recently tackled the problem of a naturalized semantics (Fodor 1987, Chapter 
4), espousing a version of the causal theory of content. The causal connection between 
an object (e.g., horse) and an appropriate internal token ('horse') may be mediated by 
intentional links. This would appear to undercut the claim that a naturalized semantics 
C O N C E P T U A L  D E P E N D E N C Y  AS THE L A N G U A G E  OF T H O U G H T  295 
has been achieved. Fodor deals with this issue by claiming that 'For purposes of semantic 
naturalization, it's the existence of a reliable mind/world correlation that counts, not the 
mechanisms by which that correlation is effected' (p. 122, Fodor's italics). Who says so? 
It looks to me as if this is pure stipulation, and that semantic naturalization is achieved 
by leaving something essential--a description of the causal mechanisms--out of the 
story. Once the underlying intentional mechanisms are described, however, the claim to 
semantic naturalization for internal tokens loses its plausibility. 
17 Even if they were the same, however, it would not follow that the respective beliefs 
were the same. As Putnam has repeatedly urged-- most recently in Putnam 1988--agents' 
beliefs are a function, not only of mental representation, but of the contexts in which 
agents are embedded. 
Is Dreyfus 1979 has built an extensive case for his contention that the results obtained 
in such microworlds do not admit of generalization, and do not constitute an appropriate 
model for human mental processes. 
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